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Antiquities Act Monuments: The Elgin Marbles of Our Public Lands? 
James R. Rasband* 
Introduction 
Although it often escapes notice in conversations about important environmental legislation, 
the Antiquities Act has been one of the most powerful conservation tools of this century. 
Antiquities Act monuments have not only protected some of our nation’s most spectacular 
landscapes but have paved the way for a number of our most treasured national parks. Grand 
Canyon, Zion, Bryce, Olympic, and Grand Teton were all monuments before they became parks. 
Looking back it may seem hard to see how anyone could question the virtue of the Antiquities 
Act. Yet that is what this paper intends, at least in part.  
The problem with the Antiquities Act is not the results it has produced but the process—or, 
more accurately, the lack of process—by which those results have been achieved. Over and over 
in its 100-year history, the Antiquities Act has been wielded by presidents without any regard for 
the local rural communities and the state and county governments most impacted by the 
monument’s designation. It does not need to be that way. Whether by using the withdrawal 
process provided in the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), or, preferably, by 
amending the Antiquities Act to allow participation by state and local governments, or, at very 
least, by voluntarily adhering to a collaborative model under the existing Antiquities Act, largely 
the same preservation benefits could be achieved without disregarding affected public lands 
communities. 
Presidential monument-making under the Antiquities Act has yielded a familiar pattern. 
Monument proclamations are met by a firestorm of protest in the affected community but the 
protest is followed by acquiescence and then acceptance. Thus, when President Roosevelt used 
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the Antiquities Act in 1943 to set aside Jackson Hole National Monument, there was outrage in 
Wyoming. But, seven years later Congress added the monument lands to the Grand Teton 
National Park, albeit with an amendment to the Antiquities Act prohibiting any additional 
monument designations in Wyoming. Likewise, when President Johnson in January of 1969, just 
ninety minutes before he was to leave office, signed Antiquities Act proclamations adding some 
264,000 acres to Arches and Capitol Reef National Monuments, the reaction in Utah was 
outrage. Utah Senator Wallace Bennett protested that the proclamations were a “last gasp attempt 
to embalm a little more land in the West,” and were “unilateral . . . with no notice whatsoever, 
without hearing any interested group, without prior consultation with Congress and without 
consultation or discussion with state officials.”1 But when the Federal Land Policy Management 
Act (FLPMA) was debated and passed seven years later in 1976, there was nary a word about the 
Antiquities Act. Indeed, although FLPMA specifically eliminated several sources of executive 
withdrawal authority, it left the Antiquities Act untouched. Likewise, when President Clinton, in 
1996, set aside some 1.7 million acres of public land in Utah’s red rock country as Grand 
Staircase–Escalante National Monument, Utah’s congressional delegation cried foul over the 
administration’s failure to consult them or to give any public notice of the proposal, and the 
president and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt were hung in effigy in the southern Utah counties 
within which the monument is located. Yet now, ten years later, most criticism of the Grand 
Staircase proclamation has faded away and Utah travel and outdoor websites are filled with 
pictures and descriptions of the monument’s wonders. 
Why is it that monument proclamations have so routinely brought criticism only to see that 
criticism fade over time? One part of the answer is clear: a vast majority like the results and thus 
any squeamishness about the means is rather quickly forgotten. The public preference for 
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preserving natural wonders is not new, but it has increased dramatically in the last forty years. 
Recreation visits to the national park system grew from 33 million in 1950 to over 277 million in 
2002. Total visitor-days on BLM lands climbed from just over 31 million in 1972 to almost 68 
million in 2002. Recreation in the national forests climbed from 27.4 million visitor-days in 1950 
to 341.2 million in 1996.2 As these numbers reveal, recreation and preservation are rapidly 
becoming the dominant uses of the public lands. 
Another reason that criticism of monuments fades is that over time few remember the means 
by which lands were preserved. The on-the-ground fact of the monument is what drives public 
perception, not how it was created in an ever-receding past. In assessing the historical benefits of 
the Antiquities Act, it is important to avoid falling into this trap. It is not enough to point to all of 
the monuments and declare the Act good. Praiseworthy preservation results are not the only 
measure by which the Antiquities Act should be judged. Just as important is the process by which 
those results were achieved. In the absence of a legitimate process, Antiquities Act monuments 
risk becoming something like the Elgin Marbles—the sculptures taken from the Parthenon early 
in the nineteenth century by Lord Elgin and then sold to the British Museum. Although Elgin’s 
preservation of the Marbles may have been wise and although they are undeniably one of the 
world’s treasures, the means by which they were acquired tarnishes the achievement.3 
Ironically enough, this basic principle about the relevance of the process by which 
monuments are proclaimed is confirmed in the very wilderness literature inspired by the lands 
which the Antiquities Act seeks to preserve. The consistent message of wilderness literature, as 
revealed in the writings of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Joseph Sax, and 
other preservationists as well as in the recreational writing of anglers, mountaineers, and hunters, 
is that we are redeemed and ennobled by adherence to certain virtues in our interaction with 
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wilderness.4 Wilderness experiences are valuable because they teach us virtues like 
sportsmanship, restraint, deliberation, sensitivity to impact, and patient woodcraft. Yet, if these 
virtues govern our interaction with wilderness, should they not also govern our acquisition of 
wilderness, our monument-making? In the end, it is not enough merely to proclaim a monument 
any more than it is sufficient to simply bag a deer, net a fish, run a river, or scale a mountain; it is 
the manner by which the result was achieved that ultimately ennobles or devalues the activity. 
The irony of most national monument proclamations is that we claim to value the monument for 
its ability to develop within us the very virtues that we seem so quick to ignore in securing it. 
If it is true that the process by which monuments are made matters, and if it is also true that 
the Antiquities Act has produced such beneficial outcomes, the critical question is whether the 
same or similar results could be achieved by a process that does not so thoroughly disregard the 
input and interests of rural communities and state and local governments. The answer is likely 
yes. If the Antiquities Act were amended to require notice to state and local government and 
consideration of impacts on communities nearby the monument, or, in the absence of a change in 
the law, if presidents, on their own initiative, consulted with affected states and local 
governments prior to proclaiming a monument, it would not mean the end of monument 
proclamations. Nor, of course, would it likely mean the end of local community protests. But it 
might alleviate some of the tensions surrounding monument designations and it would surely be 
more in keeping with the very virtues we hope to inculcate by setting aside the land from 
development. 
Soliciting input from those connected to the land makes it more likely that unforeseen 
benefits and detriments of any monument proclamation will be taken into consideration. With 
public participation, those opposed to the monument are more likely to accept the result if they 
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have had an opportunity to participate in the development of the proposal. Consultation, of 
course, will not end opposition. Indeed, it may increase the political difficulty of presidential 
monument-making. Yet, by analogy to wilderness literature, undertaking the difficult task of 
comprehending and carefully navigating the cultural environment is what gives nobility to the 
venture of monument-making. 
The suggestion that the impact on local communities should be considered and balanced 
against the benefits of a monument should not be understood as an argument that the public lands 
must be managed for the benefit of local communities. Instead, the consideration of impact 
should be understood as a focus on how public lands deserving of protection can be preserved 
with the least possible negative impact on local communities. Approaches to protecting local 
communities have been explored by a number of writers. But the one theme common to the 
approaches for easing the blow suffered by local communities from public land management 
decisions is that the community and its interests should at very least be included in the decision-
making process. 
 
Amending the Antiquities Act 
If consultation with local communities would ennoble the monument proclamation process, 
why has it occurred only infrequently? The predominant reason is that the Antiquities Act does 
not require it. Certainly, presidents are free to seek input from state and local governments. For 
example, stung by the broad criticism of the process employed in the designation of Grand 
Staircase–Escalante National Monument,5 during the second term of the Clinton administration, 
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt actually did quite a bit of consulting with local communities 
about potential monument designations.6 Nevertheless, without an amendment to the Antiquities 
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Act, history suggests that presidents will most often ignore local concerns. 
Secretary Babbitt’s experience indicates that advance notice of a potential monument and 
consultation with local communities do not hinder monument proclamations. Following a more 
consultative approach, during his second term, President Clinton designated 21 additional 
monuments.7 Despite this record, the Clinton administration opposed amending the Act to 
include even the most tepid of participation obligations. For example, it threatened to veto House 
Bill 1487 which would have amended the Act to require the president to “solicit public 
participation and comment” but only “to the extent consistent with” achieving the protective 
purposes of the Antiquities Act and to “consult with the Governor and congressional delegation 
of the State ... in which the lands are located,” but only “to the extent practicable.”8 
Why has there been such opposition to any amendment of the Antiquities Act, particularly 
when consultation has not proven an impediment to monument making? The first claim that is 
usually made for leaving the Antiquities Act untouched is a historical one. Supporters point to 
such important withdrawals as the Grand Canyon and Jackson Hole and argue that they could not 
have been accomplished without the Antiquities Act. However, it is not clear that an Antiquities 
Act amended to require notice and consultation would have failed to produce these monuments. 
Moreover, whatever merit this historical argument has with respect to the need for the Act in its 
early years, it is not particularly persuasive with respect to proclamations made after the passage 
of the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976, which created an arguably 
sufficient procedure for decisive executive protection of public lands. 
Recall that historically the president’s authority to withdraw public lands for preservation 
purposes has been quite broad.9 The Antiquities Act was only one of a number of laws giving the 
president withdrawal authority, and the Supreme Court affirmed a variety of executive 
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withdrawals on the premise that congressional acquiescence in the withdrawal constituted an 
implied delegation of authority.10 With the passage of FLPMA, Congress attempted to limit the 
executive branch’s withdrawal authority by repealing numerous statutory provisions giving 
executive withdrawal power11 and then giving the secretary of the interior new withdrawal 
authority subject to congressional veto and a variety of procedural safeguards. FLPMA’s 
withdrawal provisions require the secretary of the interior to publish notice of any proposed 
withdrawal, conduct public hearings, and consult with local government bodies.12 Along with 
notice, the secretary must furnish Congress with a detailed report on the proposed withdrawal, a 
significant portion of which must address the withdrawal’s impact on local communities.13 Thus, 
after the passage of FLPMA, presidents committed to preservation likely could still accomplish 
their objectives without using the Antiquities Act, and with the added benefit of a more 
participatory approach to withdrawal decisions. 
In light of FLPMA’s withdrawal provisions, one could conclude that the Antiquities Act is 
superfluous, that instead of amendment to include a participation requirement, the Act should 
simply be repealed. While this view is not without merit, repealing the Antiquities Act before 
testing the limits of FLPMA’s withdrawal provisions seems unwise. Before explaining why that 
is the case, however, it is useful to explore more fully whether it at least makes sense to consider 
FLPMA, rather than an unamended Antiquities Act, as the preferred preservation tool. 
Supporters of the Antiquities Act often argue that the Antiquities Act is critical because it 
allows the president to respond rapidly to emergency situations where public lands are threatened 
with irreparable harm. Yet most monument proclamations have not arisen as a result of 
emergencies. Moreover, FLPMA’s withdrawal provisions specifically allow the secretary of the 
interior to make an emergency withdrawal of any amount of lands for a period not to exceed 
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three years.14 Thus, in a real emergency, FLPMA already allows circumvention of public 
participation to protect critical resources. 
Supporters have also argued that the Antiquities Act is critical to accomplish preservation 
because it allows the president rather than Congress to decide whether particular lands should be 
protected. Given that the Constitution’s Property Clause charges Congress with the obligation of 
managing the public lands,15 the Act’s supporters do not often make the blunt argument that they 
do not want Congress to make the decision because Congress might not favor the withdrawal. 
They make a subtler point. They assert that the public and a majority in Congress would indeed 
support preservation legislation but that the majority’s will is often thwarted by filibusters and 
sharp legislative maneuvering, particularly the ability of long-standing committee chairmen from 
public lands states who have the ability to bottle up protective legislation in committee.16 This 
frustration is legitimate and reflects historical reality. That is precisely what led President 
Eisenhower to declare the C&O Canal National Monument and President Roosevelt to declare 
the Jackson Hole National Monument.17 Moreover, given the increasing public preference for 
recreation and preservation of the public lands, it does indeed appear that a current and growing 
majority in Congress would support greater preservation. 
Nevertheless, this legitimate concern is not a persuasive argument for the necessity of using 
the Antiquities Act because FLPMA was again designed to answer this concern. FLPMA allows 
the secretary to make withdrawals of any acreage for a period of up to twenty years unless 
Congress within ninety days rejects it by a concurrent resolution.18 Moreover, FLPMA 
specifically prohibits the committee to which the withdrawal is referred from bottling up the vote 
on the resolution if any proponent demands a discharge of the withdrawal issue.19 Thus, FLPMA 
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provides a mechanism to circumvent committee roadblocks and actually test Congress’ support 
for the withdrawal.  
These same veto provisions, however, present the greatest risk in relying exclusively on 
FLPMA and simply repealing the Antiquities Act. Given the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,20 finding a similar legislative 
veto provision unconstitutional, there are serious questions about whether FLPMA’s legislative 
veto provisions would survive constitutional challenge. Although the secretary’s FLPMA 
withdrawal authority could even be strengthened if FLPMA’s veto provisions were held to be 
unconstitutional yet severable from the rest of the withdrawal process, it is also possible that a 
court could strike down the secretary’s entire withdrawal authority. 
The Chadha precedent presents a threat to the FLPMA withdrawal process but not enough of 
one to justify wholesale rejection of FLPMA’s more inclusive and deliberative withdrawal 
process. It would still be possible, for instance, to simultaneously withdraw a monument under 
both FLPMA and the Antiquities Act. If FLPMA’s withdrawal provisions proved 
unconstitutional, the monument would still survive, and the process would have been more 
collaborative. If FLPMA’s veto provisions survived legal challenge, the argument for using the 
Antiquities Act would be further diminished. Admittedly, the FLPMA approach might be a bit 
more arduous, time-consuming, or politically difficult but that is not a sufficient justification for 
completely excluding affected communities from the decision. 
Even if FLPMA’s veto provisions survived judicial scrutiny, some might be reluctant to use it 
as a substitute for the Antiquities Act. Under FLPMA, Congress can veto presidential action and 
a secretarial withdrawal assures only twenty years of protection, whereas under the Antiquities 
Act the president may act unilaterally and monuments have no expiration date. Neither of these 
 
 9 
arguments are overwhelming. Antiquities Act withdrawals can themselves be overturned by 
Congress, albeit with more procedural hurdles than with the FLPMA veto process. Moreover, if 
Antiquities Act supporters are correct, and they surely are, that locally disputed monuments have 
broad public support and quickly become national treasures, it is extremely unlikely that 
Congress would initially veto a withdrawal, and even more unlikely that after twenty years, 
Congress would not finally ratify the withdrawal. 
Nevertheless, it is true that FLPMA’s twenty-year limit on the withdrawal and its potential 
for congressional veto of the withdrawal do pose some additional risks to monument making. But 
that conclusion is not an argument for leaving the Antiquities Act unamended. The notification, 
consultation, and impact study requirements contained in FLPMA could be grafted onto the 
Antiquities Act without significant harm to preservation efforts. On balance, for those concerned 
about both preservation and a more ennobling process, this appears the best course for now. 
Although FLPMA’s withdrawal process is preferable to an unamended Antiquities Act, 
amending the Act to include process protections would retain the benefit of decisive presidential 
action while diminishing any risk of losing a monument at the end of twenty years.  
The political reality, of course, is that amendment of the Antiquities Act is as unlikely now as 
it has been historically. Nevertheless, nothing prevents the president from voluntarily engaging in 
a worthier monument withdrawal process. In fact, non-compulsory adherence to a virtuous 
process may ultimately enhance the nobility of the preservationist project more than obligated 
adherence to codified virtue.  
Conclusion 
In his book Fire on the Plateau, Charles Wilkinson concludes that the history of the 
American West has been one of “conquest by certitude.” He contends that many of the harms 
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suffered by the Indian peoples and the lands of the Colorado Plateau have been the result of 
decisions by government officials “who knew to an absolute certainty what was right for the 
Colorado Plateau.”21 Wilkinson’s “conquest by certitude” thesis seems a largely accurate 
characterization of public lands policy in the nineteenth century. Confident in the moral, 
economic, and scientific wisdom of Manifest Destiny, Americans were sure about what was the 
best use of the public lands and what was best for the Indian tribes who dwelled there. Means 
were not particularly important because the ends were so plainly correct. 
The more interesting question is whether Wilkinson’s thesis remains applicable today. 
Specifically, is aggressive use of the Antiquities Act a repetition of this historical pattern of 
conquest by certitude? Should we be so certain about the altruism and correctness of our 
preservation preference that we eschew any obligation to consult with those rural communities 
that have developed real and lasting attachments to the public lands, at least in part because of 
their reliance on public policies that encouraged that attachment? If so, we are forgetting that our 
nineteenth-century predecessors believed with just as much conviction that settling and 
developing those lands was the right thing to do. 
If our current public lands agenda runs the same risk of conquest by certitude, what is the 
answer? Must monument-making take a back seat to natural resource extraction? Not necessarily. 
The solution is not to abandon the preservation preference but to exhibit more skepticism about 
its achievement. At a minimum, skepticism implies a willingness constantly to question the 
necessary scope of our public lands aspirations and our means for achieving them. In the 
monument context, some of that questioning should be directed at rural communities in the form 
of requiring public participation and impact studies prior to a monument proclamation. The idea 
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of public participation and impact studies is neither novel nor earth-shattering in natural 
resources law, except, apparently, in the case of the Antiquities Act. 
Ultimately, the test for those of us who favor the increasingly dominant public land uses of 
preservation and recreation is whether this time we can exhibit less certitude about our public 
lands preference by recognizing the interests of the communities who are a part of the fabric of 
those lands. Amending the Antiquities Act to include minimal notification and public 
participation requirements would be a good beginning. 
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